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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a simple approach to address the issue of how revenue sharing in professional 
sports leagues can affect the allocation of free agent players to teams. To affect the allocation of 
free agents, the imposition of revenue sharing must alter the ranking of bidding teams in terms of 
maximum salary offers. Two types of revenue sharing systems are considered: traditional gate 
revenue sharing and pooled revenue sharing. The paper suggests that team rankings for ability to 
pay are not affected by pooled revenue sharing, however the distribution of player salaries will be 
compressed. Traditional gate revenue sharing can alter the ability to pay rankings for teams, 
depending upon playing schedules and the closeness of revenues between closely ranked teams. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The economics of professional sports literature is rich in papers that consider the effects of 
different types of revenue sharing systems on player salaries and league parity. For good reason, 
revenue sharing is an important phenonmenon to study since it is unique to the business of 
professional sports and is an important characteristic of the odd antitrust status given to 
professional sports leagues. Some important papers are El Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and 
Quirk (1995), Marburger (1997) and Kesenne (2000), to name a few. Most of these papers focus 
on the effects of revenue sharing on league parity, but few focus on the effect of revenue sharing 
on the allocation of scarce talent. An exception is Miller (2007) who uses a three-stage game 
theoretic model of competitive free agent bidding that incorporates initial bids and subsequent 
salary negotiations. With unequal revenue sharing (high revenue teams pay a higher share of 
revenue than low revenue teams) Miller (2007) shows that revenue sharing will not affect the 
allocation of free agents among winning bidders, although it will compress the salary distribution 
of free agents unequally.  
 
This paper focuses on why professional sports leagues have tended to move away from gate 
revenue sharing towards pooled revenue sharing, using the argument that gate revenue sharing 
can distort the allocation of free agents among teams while pooled revenue sharing cannot. If the 
simple analysis done here is extended to the league voting model of Easton and Rockerbie (2005), 
one can see why pooled revenue sharing might receive more favorable votes among owners, 
particularly wealthy ones. The analysis is kept simple here and focuses on the mechanics of the 
two revenue sharing systems. Strategic behavior among clubs who anticipate revenue sharing is 
not considered, instead we assume that each club formulates a bid for a particular free agent in the 
off-season by taking its post revenue sharing revenue as given from the previous season. Any 
change in the league revenue ranking of a team will directly affect its ability to make a winning 
bid for a particular free agent. The next two sections of the paper discuss the effects of revenue on 
the allocation of free agents among competitive bidding teams under the more recently adopted 
pooled revenue sharing and the historic gate revenue sharing systems. The last section of the 
paper provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Pooled Revenue Sharing 
 
In a pooled revenue sharing system, all teams in a league contribute a fixed percentage of local 
revenues in regular installments to a central league fund. On a specific date, each team receives a 
payment equal to an equal share of the fund. The definition of local revenues differs by 
professional league, but here we assume these are simply all revenues derived directly from the 
hosting of a game. To set up the model, we assume a professional sports league composed of N 
teams, each team playing each other team once at home and once on the road (this is not essential 
to the analysis). Before revenue sharing, each team earns revenue from home games equal to  
which are not all equal. Home revenues are distributed on a continuum from the highest revenue 
team, , to the lowest revenue team, . The exact form of the revenue distribution is not 
important to the model developed here, but we will assume that it is uniform for convenience. To 
analyze the possibility of a team changing position in the revenue distribution after revenue 
sharing, we consider only the top two revenue earning teams in the league. If a reversal is 
possible, it should be possible between any other two teams in the league and our analysis is then 
sufficient. We ignore the case where 
h
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( )αhihi RR = , but it is quite likely that imposing revenue 
sharing of any form will alter the optimal stock of talent for each team. That case is dealt with in 
detail in Miller (2007) and Easton and Rockerbie (2005). 
 
After revenue sharing, net revenues for teams 1 and 2 are given by 
 
∑∑
==
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
N
i
h
i
hh
N
i
h
i
h R
N
R
N
RR
N
RR
3
21
2
1
*
1
111 ααααα     (1) 
∑∑
==
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
N
i
h
i
hh
N
i
h
i
h R
N
R
N
RR
N
RR
3
12
3,1
2
*
2
111 ααααα     (2) 
 
The revenue sharing coefficient α is the share of home revenues that teams do not contribute to 
the central fund. Each team receives back some of its revenue contributed to the central fund, as 
well as some of the revenue from its nearest revenue rival. 
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A “reversal” is defined here as a situation where  and . To find a condition 
under which a reversal occurs, we take the difference  and set it to be greater than zero. 
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Simplifying (5) provides a necessary condition for central pool revenue sharing to create a 
reversal between the post-sharing revenues of teams 1 and 2. 
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Condition (6) is impossible as it requires the revenue sharing coefficient to be negative, therefore 
a reversal is not possible between the top two revenue teams with central pool revenue sharing. 
The two teams under consideration need not be the top two revenue teams in the league. The only 
requirement for the result is that one team has higher revenues than another team before revenue 
sharing. Without reversals, central pool revenue sharing should not affect the distribution of free 
agent talent among teams since the overall league rankings of revenues is unaffected. Revenue 
sharing will redistribute revenue from rich teams to poor teams and may compress the salary 
distribution of free agents, but it will not affect who the winning bidders will be. 
 
3. Gate Revenue Sharing 
 
Major league baseball and the National Football League used a gate revenue sharing system 
before the mid-1990’s. In this system, each team gives a share of its gate revenue from a home 
game to the visiting team. The effect on a team’s post-sharing revenue depends upon its schedule 
of games. For instance, a rich team that plays the majority of its road games against poor team 
opponents might suffer from gate revenue sharing. On the other hand, a poor team that plays the 
majority of its road games against rich teams will fair better than without revenue sharing. In the 
central pool revenue sharing system, this skewness in the post-sharing revenues depending upon 
the team schedule does not occur. With N teams operating in a league with a uniform distribution 
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of home revenues and each team playing M < N of the teams only once, the post-sharing 
revenues for the richest team and second richest teams are given by 
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In (7) and (8), road games are denoted with an “r” and home games with an “h”. We assume that 
team 1 has the highest revenue generating potential of any of the N teams regardless of who the 
visiting opponent is. This can be expressed as { } iRRRR h iNhih ihi ∀> ,,3,2,1 ,, … . We further assume 
that each teams earns the same total home revenue regardless of opponent for a single game. For 
instance, team 1 earns the same total home revenue from each of its home games regardless of the 
opponent, but this constant home revenue is higher than the single game home revenue for any 
other team in the league regardless of opponent. The essential assumption is that fans do not care 
which team is visiting for a game, attendance is always the same. In fact, many papers have used 
this sort of revenue function where home attendance depends only on the winning percentage of 
the home team (Fort and Quirk (1995) as an example).  
 
Taking the difference between the post-sharing revenues and making it positive gives 
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The last term in (9) captures the effect on post-sharing revenues of different playing schedules for 
teams 1 and 2. This difference could be positive if team 2 plays higher revenue teams on the road 
than team 1 does. For now we assume the difference is zero for simplicity, however we will deal 
with differing schedules later in this section. By the assumption of identical home gate revenues 
for any opponent ( ( ) ( ) hrhr RRMRRM 11,222,1 1 and 1 =−=− ), condition (9) reduces to 
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Although condition (10) is mathematically possible, it places a severe restriction on the size of the 
revenue sharing coefficient that causes a post-sharing revenue reversal between team 1 and team 
2. The National Football League used α = 0.6 up to the mid-1990’s while major league baseball 
used roughly values of 0.8 and 0.95 for the National League and the American League. Condition 
(10) virtually requires the high revenue teams to become the low revenue teams by switching 
their revenues. 
 
It could be the case that if team 2 plays higher revenue teams on the road than team 1, a reversal 
will occur. This amounts to assuming that the last term in (9) is positive. For convenience we now 
assume that team 1 does not play team 2, perhaps because they operate in different divisions or 
even different leagues (such as the American League and the National League before interleague 
games). Condition (9) is then 
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The condition for a reversal can be found to be 
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Since , α > 0 is assured in (12). If  is small, then the condition for α 
becomes more relaxed, that is, the value for α can be larger and a reversal can still occur. This 
makes sense since the needed post-sharing drop in revenues for team 1 is quite small in order to 
see a reversal. If  is large, the condition for α also becomes more relaxed. 
This also makes sense since a more unbalanced revenue schedule in favor of team 2 is 
more likely to cause a post-sharing revenue reversal.  
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4. Summary 
 
This short paper has addressed the question of whether the distribution of free agents among 
winning bidders is altered by two different forms of revenue sharing: central pool revenue sharing 
and gate revenue sharing. In a simple ascending bid auction, if a team bids up to the surplus 
received by the next lowest surplus team from signing the free agent, plus one dollar, the higher 
bidder will win the free agent. This will be true no matter what the shape of the revenue 
distribution is as long as the team revenue rankings are preserved. A reversal was defined as a 
situation where a higher revenue team moves down in the rankings of team revenues after 
revenue sharing. Revenue sharing then affects the distribution of free agents by changing the 
team revenue rankings. The model assumed that the league is composed of N teams with a 
uniform distribution of revenues, although allowing for skewed revenue distributions will not 
change the results of the paper. Central pool revenue sharing cannot affect the distribution of 
team revenue rankings and hence cannot affect the allocation of free agents among winning 
bidders. Central pool revenue sharing will reallocate revenue from high revenue teams to low 
revenue teams and compress the distribution of free agent salaries. Gate revenue sharing can 
create a revenue reversal between two clubs if they are not far apart in pre-sharing gate revenues 
and the lower home revenue club plays a more lucrative revenue road schedule than the higher 
revenue club. Perhaps this why both the National Football League and Major League Baseball 
moved from gate revenue sharing to central pool revenue sharing in the mid-1990’s. 
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